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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the pattern of technological progress from the
perspective of less developed countries. This path of technological
development is different from the pattern of technological development in
developed countries.
In examining technological progress in less developed countries, I provide
an overview of technological development in Korea. Korea has successfully
achieved the adaptation of imported technology and is now capable of
developing indigenous technology.
The research has been done based on articles, books, and journals,
attending seminars, meeting scholars, and visiting research institutes in Korea
and the United States.
A less developed country tends to progress in its technological capability
through three stages of development: acquisition & implementation,
assimilation, and improvement. In order to achieve technological progress,
there are some critical elements. For example, the educational level of labor,
the industrial infrastructure, the receptiveness of management skills,
entrepreneurship, and government industrial policy appear to be important
factors in contributing to technological progress.
At the same time, as a country progresses from the early stages of
development to the later stages of development, it seems that a country needs
to develop higher levels of indigenous technology. Competitiveness and
comparative advantage change from labor intensive to capital and technology
intensive products, and the importation of high-technology tends to be made
difficult by increasing protection of intellectual property rights and increasing
competition of existing products in the global market.
This research will hopefully provide lessons for other developing countries
for their technological development in the process of industrialization.
Although the case of Korea shares common features with other developing
countries, the implementation of technology policy should depend on the
specific condition of a particular country.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lance Taylor
Title: Professor of Economics
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This thesis considers what technology means to less developed countries and
how these countries are able to develop their capability to make use of
knowledge and skills for production. Therefore, technological development should
be understood in a broaden sense than merely from the perspective of developed
countries.
In doing so, I will investigate the Korean experience of
industrialization/economic development in achieving its present economic status
in the international community. A general overview will be presented -- Korea's
development process with its outward-looking economy and highly concentrated
economic structure dominated by large firms. In some ways this strategy has
enhanced technological progress by exposing Korean business to the outside
world and encouraging them to compete in world markets.
First I will focus on the issue of adaptation of technology from other
industrialized countries through three key stages: the acquisition/implementation,
assimilation, and improvement stages. This kind of technological progress I call
"incremental." This pattern of technological development is different from the
dynamic model experienced in developed countries, such as radical/product and
incremental/process innovation, through idea generation, problem solving, and
implementation.'
According to several Korean scholars, the technological development of less-
developed countries is distinguished from this dynamic model in terms of the
reduced availability and capability of scientific and technological knowledge in
the early stage of their economic development.
What they observe in less developed countries, and particularly in Korea, is
a reverse pattern of that in developed countries. This is because less developed
countries usually import technologies from developed countries in the early stages
of their development, then are only able to produce new products in the later
stages when they have accumulated sufficient technological capability.
Second, I will look at the specific channels of technology transfer from
developed countries to less developed countries. It is argued that there are
basically two kinds of channels: informal and formal. Informal is identified as
technology transfer through informal contacts with sellers and buyers, journals,
staff education/training abroad, and importation of foreign products. Formal is
exemplified by joint ventures and licensing agreements.
Since informal channels of technology transfer are poorly documented, I will
focus on the formal channels of technology transfer: joint ventures and licensing
agreements. In addition, I will investigate the role of multinational
companies(MNCs) in technology transfer to local firms and industry.
1 For example, Abernathy and Utterback define the development of technology based on the
product cycle: product and process innovation. Product innovation occurs when the basic and
applied science and knowledge are materialized in new products, and process innovation occurs
in the later stages of product cycle in an efforts of increase efficiency and productivity.
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It is important to point out that the efforts and commitments in absorbing
the foreign technology made by Korean firms was the most crucial factor in the
development of their ability to advance in production. The Korean government
is also effective in facilitating technology transfer through appropriate policies.
Third, I will address the issue of technological independence in Korea. I will
present its needs and background in terms of Korea's situation in the
international market and its competitiveness as one of the newly industrialized
countries(NICs). Not only does Korea face the challenges of changing internal
and external factors but also of developing its indigenous technology.
I will investigate Hyundai Motor Company's efforts for technological "self-
reliance." Hyundai has so far performed better than the other major Korean
auto makers which largely depend on the technology of their foreign partners.
In presenting Hyundai's example, I will also discuss the experience of Toyota.
Its early development seems to share some common approaches to Hyundai.
Finally, I will incorporate the linkages between large firms and small firms
in Korea. As previously mentioned, the Korean economy is largely concentrated
in large firms. The promotion of the large firms was rationalized as a means
of growing fast and for targeting efficiency. In recent years, however, as Korea
requires more advanced technology, it is obvious that an economy dominated by
large firms tends to be inefficient and too rigid for a dynamic and creative
business environment.
At the same time, advanced component industries are in demand while Korea
still depends for its component supplies on manufacturers in developed countries.
The bilateral trade deficit with Japan is due to the importation of industrial
components. There is a need for small firms' flexibility in innovating new
products and producing sophisticated components. This kind of problem is
already on the way to being resolved. Academic studies show that new small
firms tend to be more innovative and productive than existing small firms, in
areas such as R&D investment and employment generation. It is argued that
in order to promote an advanced economy, the roles of small firms and the
linkages between large and small firms will be important. This is because large
firms are the main potential market for these creative small firms, as well as a
channel of technology transfer. A market-incentive policy measure is more
effective than subsidies and other direct financial support in promoting innovative
small firms.
Korea faces new opportunities as well as challenges in its progress to
advanced-country status. Korea is on the second transition from a NIC to
developed country just as it successfully transformed itself from a poor country
to a newly- industrialized country. The promotion of small firms is part of
the new strategy needed to ensure this next progression.
CHAPTER 1: KOREA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH
"INCREMENTAL INNOVATION"
1.1: INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the development of what I call "incremental innovation"
in the process of industrialization in Korea. This pattern of technological
development in Korea is different from the pattern in developed countries, and
provides a lesson for less developed countries with a similar experience in
economic and social environments in the early stages of their economic
development.
It is appropriate to examine Korea's technological development in its context
as a technological recipient, in the absence of accumulation of technological
knowledge and capability,' at the beginning of its industrialization. For example,
the incremental innovation practiced in Korean industries, and in other newly
industrialized countries, is characterized by a gradual improvement in productivity
and quality of products that use foreign technologies, that does not necessarily
exceed the productivity of developed countries. In less developed countries,
technology development follows acquisition/implementation, assimilation, and
improvement phases.
The analysis will not follow the pattern of innovation practiced in developed
1 Here, "technological capability" is defined as the ability to make effective use of technological
knowledge in assimilating, using, adapting, creating new technology.
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countries, from production innovation to process innovation depending on the
position in the product life-cycle. Technological development in Korea has
progressed from process development in the early stages of industrialization to
product development in the later stages of industrialization: the reverse of the
conventional developed country pattern. Thus this analysis will be based on how
a less developed country has adopted foreign technologies and then develops its
own capacity to innovate in an incremental way.
In analyzing incremental innovation, I will discuss the major factors which
have contributed to the particular development of innovation in Korea; I argue
that the stage of industrialization, the pace of industrialization, and the needs
of an outward looking economy have each indirectly promoted the process of
incremental innovation.
This incremental approach has largely been pursued by large firms in an
effort to reduce production costs and improve the quality of existing goods.
At the same time, this type of approach to technological innovation has provided
a strategic rationale for the Korean government to support large firms. The
advantages of economies of scale were reaped by large firms, and used as a
weapon for price competition in international markets.
Finally, I will discuss the new challenges facing the Korean economy: the
recent appreciation of the Won, domestic wage increases, and the increasing
threat of international protectionism. I will consider the approaches of the
Korean government and these firms to these emerging problems, in their attempts
to sustain economic growth.
This new kind of problem facing the Korean economy increases the need for
indigenous technology. The achievement of this need largely depends on Korea's
ability to develop new products. Product innovation in Korea will be on the
basis of using accumulated existing incremental innovation to secure technological
independence and renewed industrialization.
1.2: KOREA'S ECONOMY: THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
Korea has emerged as a major newly industrialized country (NIC). A few
key factors should be highlighted as responsible for its impressive economic
development: an outward-looking development strategy, the high level of
education of the Korean people, and the successful effort to internalize foreign
technologies for local uses. Since 1962, Korea has grown at an annual average
rate of 8.4% per year, its GNP per capita in real terms has grown about
ninefold from 1966 to 1986.2
2Principal Economic Indicators, Bank of Korea, 1987.
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Table 1.1: Basic Statistics of Korean Trade & Growth
GDP Export
Period Growth Rate(%) Growth Rate(%) Export/GDP(%)
1961-65 6.5 39.6 3.1
1966-70 12.7 32.0 8.2
1971-75 9.0 32.5 19.9
1976-80 7.6 15.3 26.1
1981-85 7.6 12.6 30.0
Source: Korean Traders Association
In the beginning of its economic development, Korea had a comparative
advantage in labor-intensive products in world markets. In order to expand its
economy, Korea had to concentrate on labor-intensive industries for promoting
exports, such as apparel, plywood, and textiles.' Korea adopted very low level
technology through informal channels in the early stages of its industrialization,
such as consulting technical and trade journals, copying foreign products, and
sending nationals abroad for education. This kind of technological
implementation represents reverse engineering through learning by doing.
In the later stages of its industrialization, Korea has acquired its technologies
through formal channels, such as joint ventures and licensing agreements. For
example, the number of licensing agreements was minimal in the 60s and early
* A World Bank Country Study, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, Vol. 1, March,
1987.
70s compared to the late 70s and the 80s.' As Korea transforms from low
technology-intensive to high technology-intensive industries, technological
development through the formal channels of transfer has increased. The
channels and patterns of technology transfer are different according to the
development stage and the types of industrial technology."
Through its economic development, Korea gained a substantial technological
capability. The major factors behind Korea's successful adaptation of imported
technology are three: availability of local entrepreneurs, skilled engineers and
technicians, and government development policy. For example, a large pool of
skilled labor has facilitated increases in productivity and quality improvements
for existing products. The high skilled labor force, that quickly learned and
assimilated product design and production techniques, contributed to the
achievement of the indigenous technological stage.
In Korea, the illiteracy rate dropped from 27.9% in 1960 to 11.6% in 1970
and became almost negligible by 1980. Korea surpasses other NICs in almost
all indices of educational attainment. At the same time the share of education
spending in the government budget rose from 2.5% in 1951 to 22% in 1985,
while the government expenditures accounted for only one-third of the total
educational expenditures, the remainder being borne by the private sector and
* Ministry of Science and Technology. '88 Sicence and Technology Annual, March 15, 1989.
Also see Exhibit 1.
'Jinsoo Lee, Zong-tae Bae, & Dong-kyu Choi, "Technology Development Processes: A model
for a developing country with a global perspective," R&D Management, Vol. 18, No. 3, July,
1988.
parents.'
Therefore, it seems that education is one of most important factors in the
development of technological capability in Korea. This argument is already
supported by evidence from the 19th century of the correlation between
educational indices and the speed with which individual Western countries were
able to adopt and modify Britian's new industrial technology.'
This path of technological progress in Korea departs from the "incremental
innovation" discussed by William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback,
although some aspects share common characteristics with Korean development.
They argue that incremental innovation generally occurs after radical innovation
in largely established products, and in those with high volume and considerable
standardization in the later stage of the product life-cycle. These products
primarily compete on the basis of price and efficiency, by gradual and
cumulative improvements in productivity, typified by learning by doing. This
contrasts with product innovation, which is the result of specific research and
development projects in search of innovative products.
* L. Kim, "Technological Transformation in Korea: Progress Achieved and Problems Ahead,"
The World Institute for Development Economic Research, Helsinki, 1986.
'N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge University Press, London, 1976.
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1.3: OUTWARD-LOOKING AND LARGE FIRM DOMINANT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
In Korea, large firms have played a major role in contributing to economic
growth through an export led strategy, so encouraging the incremental approach.
Because Korea pursued rapid industrialization with only a limited amount of
basic knowledge in science and technology, it concentrated on price competition
based on efficiency instead of competition on the basis of product differentiation
or radically new products. In order to achieve price competitiveness in
international markets, the Korean government promoted large firms through
providing financial and technical assistance, allowing them to reap the benefits
of economies of scale and diversified organizational capacity in managing and
marketing.
According to The Economist, in Korea financial repression channelled cheap
credit to a relatively small number of large firms, while the average size of firms
went up by 180% between 1966 and 1976. Although these large firms had
almost total control over the domestic market, they rarely introduced new
products. This observation underlines that these firms more concentrated on
more adopting foreign technologies than on innovating their own.
Why did Korean large firms focus mainly on incremental innovation rather
than radical innovation, despite their ready access to cheap loans and their
relatively strong domestic market power? The explanation turns largely on the
stage of Korean industrialization, in conjunction with the pattern of available
capital and human resources, the type of competition, and the thrust of
government industrial policy.
A study by the Korean Industrial Research Institute shows that the ratio of
Korean to foreign patents granted was less than 7% prior to 1980. In the early
stage of economic development, the demands of the small domestic market did
not initially provide a sufficient incentive for the domestic monopolists to invent
products, while the export-oriented nature of the economy drove these firms in
the direction of innovation for process technologies. One of the reasons to
import technology was the effort needed to absorb necessary technologies in a
short time span, not only to meet the demand in domestic markets, but more
importantly to compete effectively in world markets.
This pattern of technological development contrasts with the Chinese and
Indian cases. China and India have sought technological "self-reliance"
through active in-house technical capabilities and promotion of basic and applied
research. But problems have arisen with the slow growth of technology
development." Their strategies may have reflected the larger size of their
domestic markets. Both countries have a substantially bigger population and
inherited a less devastated situation than Korea which was wrecked by the
Korean War. Therefore, in Korea, technological development had to take place
through acquisition of foreign technologies, and through aiming for promotion of
exports.
Jinjoo Lee et al, 1988.
Since the mid-1960s, exports have accounted for 20-50 % of the increase in
GDP. Between 1985 and 1986, for example, the rate of consumption growth
increased only slightly from 4.8 % to 6.3 %, but GDP growth more than
doubled from 5.2 % to 12.0 % due to a sharp improvement in exports. Export
growth stimulated the inflow of technology and the acquisition of know-how.'
For example, the export-oriented economy encouraged local firms to invest for
capacity beyond local market needs to utilize economies of scale, and to acquire
technological capability rapidly for improvement of their competitiveness in
international markets, and to meet technical specifications required by foreign
buyers in providing informal technical assistance." Therefore, it appears that
the export-oriented strategy provided an incentive for local firms to advance their
technological capability.
These characteristics of technological development, through adaptation of
foreign technology, follow a pattern shared by the late industrialized countries,
such as Korea and Japan, in contrast to the pattern of innovation and
technological change of the early industrialized European countries. In particular,
Japan depended heavily on imported technology throughout the entire prewar
and the earlier years of the postwar period."
'Korea Industrial Research Institute, Industrial Technology White Paper, Korea, October, 1988.
10 Linsu Kim, Jangwoo Lee, and Jinjoo Lee, "Korea's Entry into the Computer
Industry and Its Acquisition of Technological Capability," Management Behind
Industrialization: Readings in Korean Business, Korea University Press, Seoul, Korea,
1989.
"International Development Center of Japan(IDCJ), Working Paper Series No. 38, March, 1987.
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According to Kenji Tahara, Japan followed a strategy of secondary import
substitution, which allows a period of learning to compete with the rest of the
world in ever more sophisticated goods; and secondary export substitution, which
promotes invention in the process of industrialization. Kenji Tahara identifies
the "turning point" where the country changes from reliance and dependence
on borrowed technology to the emergence of domestic technological invention.
In the case of Korea, this "turning point" seems to have been reached in
recent years, as Korean exports shifted from light manufacturing and
intermediate goods, to machinery and consumer electronic goods. This has led
to the identification of an emerging need for product innovation in this changing
environment. At the same time, uncertainty about the demands of future
markets creates the need for technological change. This kind of reaction is
defined as "defensive" technological innovation.
Because the Korean economy was largely export-oriented with a relatively
small domestic market, large firms had to focus on international markets.
International competition drove firms to reduce production costs and to improve
the quality of products by employing process technologies, rather than by
inventing new products. During the HCI(heavy and chemical industries) drive
period of the late 70s, economic development was largely geared to promoting
petro-chemical and steel industries based on "process-based" technology. Korea
has now(in 1990) become one of the ten major trading countries.
1.4: EFFORTS AND STRATEGIES IN TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
At the same time, it is important to point out that firms in Korea did not
settle for simply copying and imitating imported technologies. They undertook
subsequent minor technological modifications and gradual improvement, such as
the mastering of production-related technology for manufacturing equipment and
plant engineering.
For example, Korean pharmaceutical firms mainly imported raw materials
from abroad and manufactured drugs by fabricating, producing and packing
imported raw materials at the beginning of the technology development. From
1965, however, moves toward the localization of raw materials became active in
an effort for internalization of foreign technologies.
The Korean automobile industry, also has been transformed from its
accumulation stage of related technology(-1961), initiation stage(1962-74), early
internalization stage(1975-81), to a late internalization stage(1982-)." The
initiation stage of the Korean automobile industry was characterized by the
manufacturing of Japanese, U.S., and European auto models on semi-
knockdown(SKD) or completed knockdown(CKD) basis. The first indigenous
Korean passenger car was developed and went into production in 1975, the
beginning year of the internalization stage. The localization ratio of this
"Hyun and Lee, 1987.
passenger car reached up to 85 % at that time."
In the meantime, the Korean government promoted imports of licensed
technology by providing various assistance in order to achieve faster economic
development. In 1961, 49 percent of Korea's gross domestic product(GDP) was
in agriculture, 13 percent in manufacturing, and 38 percent in services. By
1981, the GDP share of manufacturing almost tripled to 37 percent, while that
for agriculture declined to 20 percent, and that of services rose to 43 percent.
This rapid pace of industrialization required mass production at relatively low
cost by learning in a short period of time. Therefore, in Korea, accelerated
industrialization influenced local firms to concentrate on incremental approach in
technological progress to secure improvements in productivity and quality.
In addition, the new international division of labor, a more efficient
production mode exploiting the specialization of labor, also affected indirectly the
learning of "know-how" in processing , while a large pool of skilled labor in
Korea provided multinational firms assembly bases with relatively low real
product wages. For instance, since 1967 the Korean government has established
technical training agencies to train young people in various trades. The
minimum requirement for admission to training agencies is a middle school
education(9 years). To train workers to meet increasing industrial demands,
the government founded the vocational training institutes.
In 1982, the government established the "Korea Vocational Training &
"Jinjoo Lee, Zong-tae Bae, and Dong-kyu Choi, July, 1988.
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Management Agency"(KVTMA) to manage the vocational training institutes.
Besides formal vocational schools, there are public, in-plant, and authorized
training agencies. The total number of vocational training centers as of
September 1982 was 514, which trained about 900,000 workers during 1961-
1981.14
This kind of production setting made it easier for Korean large firms to learn
shop floor knowledge through technology transfer and information flows from the
multinational firms. For example, Hyundai, one of the largest conglomerates
in Korea, has been able to attract workers who already have experience in
manufacturing. Large firms tended to benefit by recruiting these experienced
workers. At the same time, economies of scale in production gave the large
firms an advantage in cost reduction. With lower costs of production through
faster learning and economies of scale, large firms were able to contribute to
faster economic growth.
The characteristics of incremental innovation through Korean industrialization
are distinguished from the pattern of innovation for early industrializing
countries, which concentrated on product innovation through small, technology-
based units in the beginning of their industrialization, then adapted process
technologies as the new product became obsolete.
"Ministry of Labor, Korea, 1982.
1.5: THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
Korean experience shows how a technologically backward country adopts
technology, accumulates technological knowledge, and progresses according to the
requirements of its strategy of industrialization. For example, in the textile
industry, the technological development has transformed from the early stage of
technology import, a later stage of technology import, the early stage of
technology internalization, and then a later stage of technology internalization.
The early stage of technology import lasted from 1917 to 1964. The
relatively long duration of this static development phase is explained by Japanese
colonial rule. In the textile industry, the operation was owned and managed by
Japanese, and Japanese management rarely transferred technology to Koreans to
expand their market. Moreover, the Korean War and social instability delayed
any technological progress."
During this period, cotton was the dominant item in the textile industry and
quality was poor with only a small amount of cotton exported, although Jeil
Wool Company started to produce wool on the basis of accumulated
technological knowledge with previous cotton production. At the end of the
1950s, the industry began to import low levels of technology such as techniques
for producing P.V.C. and nylon.
The later stage of technological imports was from 1965 to 1971. The textile
is Korea Economic Research Institute, Technological Innovation Process of Korean
Industries and Governmental Policies, Korea, April, 1986.
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industry was identified as a key industry and subsequently tax and other
financial supports were increased as well as the importation of foreign
technologies and textile exports. During this period, imported machineries were
modernized and training for use of these machineries was provided by sellers.
At the same time, productivity increased noticeably from 0.66 worker per roll
of cotton in 1960 to 0.41 worker in 1970, while the quality of fabric improved
by using thinner yarns."
In the case of wool, domestically produced wool was rewarded a "wool
mark" which denotes the attainment of an international standard for quality,
from the International Wool Society(IWS). In the middle of 1960s, when
synthetic fiber began to attract customers, the industry felt the need to produce
it, and the major domestic companies built plants. But, acquiring the new
technology for synthetic fibers was difficult and expensive. In facing the
difficulties, the local firms began to establish their own R&D institutes.
The early stage of technological internalization took place from 1972 to 1979,
when the industry achieved some degree of internalization of foreign technology.
For instance, labor productivity increased from Won3892 in 1970 to Won6980
in 1975, and the value-added per person increased from Won1385 to Won2664
over the same period at 1975 market price. In the meantime, global
competitiveness also strengthened. At the same time, exports of textiles jumped
from Won552 billion in 1970 to Won3185 billion in 1975 and by 1975 almost
"Korea Textile Association.
half of production went for exports(49.5%). 7
Table 1.2: Development of The Textile Industry
'17-'64 '65-'71 '72-'79 '80-
No. of Firms 1,240 1,308 1,260 2,093
Production 213,886 321,208 651,597 1,720,585
Export 11,063 55,176 318,490 702,763
X 5 X 17 % 48.8% 41 %
LCR 87.9 X 98.1 Y. 100 X 100 .
VA n.a. 1,385 2,664 3,975
LP n.a. 3,892 6,980 10,742
Tech. Imports n.a. 5 15 15
Notes:
- Production and Export in million won.
- LCR stands for local content ratio.
- VA stands for value-added per person.
- Lp Stands for labor productivity.
Source: Economic Planning Board, Ministry of Science and
Technology.
During this period, the importation of technology increased to 15 methods
compared to 5 methods between 1965 and 1971 as production required more
sophisticated techniques." The labor requirement per roll of cloth also fell in
half from 0.41 in 1970 to 0.23 in 1975.
"'Economic Planning Board.
"*Ministry of Science and Technology.
Since 1980, in the later stage of internalization, the industry has succeeded
in internalizing foreign technology and partly new products and technologies have
been developed by its own R&D efforts. Facing intense global competition, the
Korean textile industry is active in designing and developing sophisticated and
quality fabrics. For instance, in March 1985, rapiers and water-jets were
employed in production, while Sunkyung textile company produced films and K
textile company invested a new product with indigenous technology. The industry
has started to export its plant technologies to other developing countries."
Through the development of technology in the Korean textile industry, we
have observed the pattern of Korean technological progress. The industry started
to acquire technology through informal channels in its early development, and
in the later stages of development, the industry internalized foreign technology
through assimilation. Recently, the industry has become able to produce new
products with its own technological capability. Therefore, the process of
incremental innovation in the textile industry has developed through effective
adaptation of foreign technology and gradual improvement of its own
technological capability.
". Korea Economic Research Institute, Technological Innovation Process of Korean
Industries and Governmental Policies, April, 1986.
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1.6: NEW CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
The Korean economy, however, has recently experienced a few key difficulties
in pursuing its price competition strategy in international markets. The main
concerns are recent high wage increases and appreciation of the won. The won
appreciated 8% against the U.S. dollar in 1987 and a further 13.7% in 1988;
wage increases averaged 17% in 1987 and 14% in 1988.20
This has driven up the cost of production in comparison with other
developing countries that compete with similar products to those of Korea. At
the same time, increasing protectionism by industrialized countries has made it
harder for Korea to export its goods and to purchase foreign technology.
This kind of environmental change has created the need for new technology
in product invention by firms. Price competition alone will not be able to
support economic growth in Korea, considering that Korea still largely depends
on exports for its economic development. As a result, Korea is aiming to shift
its economy from being capital-intensive industry-based to being technology-
intensive industry-based in its promotion of the industries of machinery, bio-
technology, and software, in addition to its earlier focus on steel and
shipbuilding which are internationally price competitive industries.2 1
Firms also began to establish their own research institutes, while they
2 Principal Economic Indicators, Bank of Korea, April, 1989.
"Korea Industrial Research Institute, Industrial Technology White Paper, 1988.
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increased their ratio of R & D expenditure to sales from 1.16 % in 1983 and
1.39 % in 1985, to 2.07 % in 1987. A study done by the Korean Industrial
Research Institute of R & D investment as a proportion of sales, by industry,
for 1987 shows that electronics is most research intensive, with a share of 3.45
%, machinery 2.07 %, chemicals 1.12 %, textiles 1.27 %, food 0.92 %.
These data reflect the importance of the electronic industry and machinery
industry in terms of research. These figures partly indicate how the high-
technology sector is considered a key sector for further Korean economic
growth.22
In order to promote technology-intensive industries, research and development
efforts are seen as of crucial importance by the Korean business community and
by the government. According to a survey by the Ministry of Science and
Technology in Korea, the R & D expenditure to GNP ratio has increased from
0.5 % in the 1970s to 1.5 % in 1985. The targeted R & D expenditure to
GNP ratio is 2.5 % for 1991."
Hyundai, a conglomerate in Korea, has begun independent research and
product development, while it has relied on in-house design of sections of the
body of its new Sonata model, recently launched in the U.S.. These increasing
efforts for technology development will certainly help promote the development
of technology-intensive industry, although expenditures on R & D do not
22'88 Ministry of Science and Technology Annual, 1989.
"'88 Ministry of Science and Technology Annual, 1989.
28
necessarily indicate direct technological progress in new products.
In addition to this R & D effort, large firms need to be able to adapt to
the reindustrialization of new markets, new products, and new technology.
Industrial policy could be used in restructuring Korean business which has been
dominated by large firms, and a dynamic approach should be considered in
terms of the relative contribution of firms of different sizes to innovation in a
particular industry. Each form of innovation has its own implications for the
organizational structure most appropriate to its implementation. Thus radical
forms of innovation, such as the creation of new products using new technologies
often require new organizational structures."
Korea attempts to progress to a new stage of industrialization, in the face
of emerging competition from other developing countries in existing product
markets and the need for technological independence in order to advance its
economy and overcome the restrictions in technology transfer by industrialized
countries. Therefore, the incremental innovation approach adopted successfully
up until now could be reinforced by a new phase of indigenous technology and
the development of new technology.
"Roy Rothwell and Walter Zegveld, Reindustrialization and Technology.
Chapter Four of this thesis discusses the complementary role of small and large firms in
technological innovation.
1.7: SUMMARY
In this chapter we have discussed the stages of technological development and
"incremental innovation" in Korea. Korea's technological development has
progressed through acquisition, assimilation, and improvement stages in the
utilization of foreign technologies, and the recent efforts of development for
indigenous technology are viewed as the results of accumulated technical
knowledge experienced throughout its industrialization process.
The Korean innovation pattern does not follow the "product generation cycle"
that Abernathy and Utterback describe, namely that innovation evolves from a
change in basic design to process innovation. Korean innovation has evolved
through incremental progress by importing technology from industrialized
countries in the early stages of its industrialization, and its focus on new
technology and product innovation in recent years.
This kind of technological development has indirectly been influenced by the
stage of industrialization, the pace of industrialization, and the needs of an
outward-looking economy. At the same time, the high level of education has
been one of the most important factors in successful adaptation of imported
technologies, including entrepreneurship and government policy, although Korea
had small domestic markets and a low base of technological knowledge at the
beginning of industrialization.
From this study, the pattern of technological development depends on
available resources and knowledge, the speed of industrialization, the phase of
industrialization, and policy orientation in achieving economic growth in the
particular country. For these reasons, Korea has pursued an incremental
approach to technological innovation to achieve economic development.
The next challenge is how Korea approaches the task of product innovation
to overcome uncertainty in the world market, while retaining its outward-looking
economic strategy. As Korea shifts its concentration from low technology
intensive to high technology intensive industry, it might need to modify its
economic structure by expanding participation of small firms, in addition to
continuing effort in R&D investment.
CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL ADOPTION
AND LOCALIZATION
2.1: INTRODUCTION
In Chapter one, we observed how Korea progressed in its technological
development through acquisition, assimilation, and internalization of foreign
technologies in the context of a less developed country. This chapter will
focus specifically on the informal and formal channels of technology transfer
in the process of economic development in Korea. This investigation will
show how a less advanced country has achieved economic growth through
successful adaptation of technology from advanced countries.
It is also argued that a country tends to acquire foreign technologies
through informal channels in its early stages of technological development and
through more formal channels in later stages of technological development as
a country requires new technologies, through joint ventures and licensing
agreements.
In dealing with this issue of technological transfer, I will investigate the
following aspects of the Korean experience: What are the important factors
for successful technological adaptation? In order to probe these questions, I
will present a brief history of Korean economic development, followed by a
description of the different channels of technology transfer, such as joint
ventures and licensing agreements, which are common in Korea.
I will argue that an effective technology transfer is only feasible when
both parties, licensor and licensee, can capture benefits through the
engagement. For instance, a licensor takes advantage of hiring inputs at
lower cost in exchange for sharing its technology with the licensee, while the
licensee can acquire valuable know-how in a short period of time and also at
lower cost.
Particularly for licensee countries, a reasonable establishment of
infrastructure is essential to accomplish the successful transfer and adoption
of technology. This includes a high degree of managerial skills and receptive
industrial skills. At the same time, the industrial policies of licensee countries
should be geared to achieving economic development.
In Korea, throughout the five-year plans, the adaptation of particular
technologies have been prioritized in key industries which are crucial for
economic sustainability and further growth in the different stages of
industrialization. What is so unique about Korean technology adaptation is
the effort to develop its "native" technology as much as possible through
mastering imported technology.
I will observe in depth how the different types of technological adaptation
have been practiced, with the linkage of key industries at different stages of
economic development. It is useful to address this aspect of technology
transfer in a particular developing country, because I suspect that Korea has
adopted mainly standardized technologies in the early stage of its
industrialization, only moving on to sophisticated and more complex
technologies in the later stage.
At the same time, I will look at joint ventures and licensing agreements
throughout the Five-Year Plans. Multinational companies' roles in technology
transfer from advanced countries to Korea will also be examined.
As we will observe throughout this chapter, joint ventures and licensing
agreements have been used as effective channels for acquiring technology in
Korea. These kinds of low cost technology transfer have helped Korea
promote economic development at a fast pace despite its limited natural
resource endowment.
However, as the Korean economy transforms from an infant stage to a
more mature stage of industrialization, accompanied with the increasing
protection of intellectual property rights by advanced countries, Korea faces
challenges ahead in acquiring and absorbing high technology for further
economic growth. Considering that the Korean economy largely depends on
exports for its growth and increasing competition in domestic and world
markets, competitiveness in international markets remains a crucial factor.
2.2: KOREA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FIVE-YEAR PLANS
The Korean economy shows some distinctive characteristics in terms of its
astonishing growth rates, its export-oriented economy, and its high
concentration ratio and dominance by large firms. This kind of economic
structure was not accidental. Recovering from the Korean war, the domestic
market was relatively small, natural resources were scarce, and technological
capability was thin.
In this sense, it can be said, ex-post, that Korea did not have any other
option than to follow an export-oriented strategy. What is important to learn
from the Korean case, however, is that Korea has succeeded in formulating
and implementing a national development strategy that is consistent with its
initial conditions and opportunities.
In order to foster economic growth from a position of backwardness, the
Korean government started the first Five-Year Plan in 1962. Since then, four
more plans have been enacted to 1987 and the sixth is taking place up to
1992. At each plan, the government promoted a few key industries crucial
to export-oriented industrialization. With import-substitution policies, the
nondurable consumer goods sector, several supporting industries, and the
manufacture of engineering goods received special support.
During the 1970-1978 period, production of manufactured goods increased
by 17.5 percent annually.' Priority was given to shipbuilding and to the
consumer goods sector during the 1960s, while during the Third and Fourth
plan periods of the 1970s, manufacturing machinery and the chemical and
petrochemical industries were given much greater emphasis. During the
1970s, production of capital goods has increased fifteen-fold, and Korea has
become one of the leading capital goods producers amongst developing
countries.
The share of manufactured exports in the country's total exports increased
rapidly, from 14 percent in 1960 to 82 percent by the Mid-1970s." Korea
initially started to export light industrial products such as textiles, garments
and wood products. It then diversified increasingly into engineering goods
such as electrical appliances and machinery and metal products. By the early
1980s, the rapid expansion of exports of manufactured goods indicates the
advanced level of technological capability and absorption.
In the meantime, Korea had secured rapid economic growth, accompanied
with substantial investment. Per capita income had increased from $87 in
1962 to $3132 in 1987 ( this could be larger following the recent won
appreciation), indicating the fast pace of economic growth over the last 25
years.
1 Korean Machinery Industry, 1981, Korea.
2 German Development Institute, Development and Perspective of the Korean
Machinery Industry, Berlin, 1978.
* Korean Machinery Industry, Korea, 1982.
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Table 2.1: GNP Annual Growth Rate M
1975-79 1980-84
United States 3.2 1.8
Japan 4.7 3.9
Korea 9.9 5.3
Source: T.W. Kang in "Is Korea the Next Japan?"
The Korean economy has been dominated by a few large conglomerates.
The top 10 large firms shared about 50 % of total GNP in 1977 and the
top 5 large firms shared the same proportion of GNP in 1984. This highly
concentrated economic structure is also consistent with export-oriented based
economic growth.
Economies of scale have been a positive factor in terms of output and
production cost in order to compete in global markets. This pattern of
industrialization had been successfully implemented by the Japanese through
"picking winners", in favor of some industries and firms via special facilities
and incentives for investment. Therefore, it was less risky to follow the
example of Korea's neighbor, particularly in its early stage of industrialization.
During the oil shock, large scale investment projects were regarded as natural
counterbalances to this kind of external shock.'
' Silvio de Franco, Alberto Eguren, and David Baughman, Korea's Experience with
the Development of Trade and Industry, The World Bank, An EDI Policy
Seminar Report. No.14, October 1988.
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Next, I will look at how the export-oriented and highly concentrated
economy has been able to achieve rapid economic growth by utilizing
imported technologies and how Korea has acquired and absorbed this
technological knowledge.
2.3: TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTATION AND STRATEGIES
In the process of technology adaptation throughout Korea's industrial
development, the Korean government has played a crucial role. During the
1960s, the self-sustainment of the national economy, sound development, and
the improvement of the balance of payments were greatly emphasized.
With a shortage of local capital and a lack of technological capability, the
country has relied heavily on foreign capital for financing investment and
importing technology for production. During the period 1973-79, the foreign
debt increased from US$4,300 million to US$20,000 million which represents a
growth of 372 percent, but the debt/GNP ratio barely grew at all -- from
31.6 percent in 1973 to 32.9 percent in 1979.'
At the same time, the entry of foreign companies was limited during the
1960s to protect the relatively weak local industrial base. During this period,
5 The World Bank, An EDI Policy Seminar Report: Korea's Experience with the
Development of Trade and Industry, no. 14, 1988.
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the major channel of technology acquisition was through "turnkey"
arrangements, which were usually associated with foreign supplier loans and
credits.
These agreements generally provided for short-term specialized services by
foreign engineering or consulting companies and were used for plant
construction for light industrial projects. Most basic industries, such as oil
refining, fertilizers, petrochemicals, and transportation, were established through
the "turnkey" arrangements during the 1960s.
In the 1970s, the inflow of foreign direct investment accelerated. The
Korean government prioritized investments in the development of the chemical
and machinery industries, and in the export-oriented manufacturing sector.
The government succeeded not only in channeling such investments into
priority sectors but also in ensuring the effective participation of domestic
companies in local multinational company operations.
In 1981, the Economic Planning Board adopted measures to promote the
flow of foreign direct investment into selected priority sectors following the
liberalization of technology regulation measures. The major objective of these
measures was to accelerate the inflow of advanced technology, that would be
difficult to obtain without substantial equity participation by their foreign
owners.
In the Fifth Plan of 1982-87, several industries were accorded priority
based on their use of advanced and complex technologies, particularly in the
export-oriented area of electronics. Much of this technology was only
available to foreign-controlled affiliates and not to independent domestic
licensees. Foreign participation was considered desirable to ensure the
commitment of technology licensors to transfer their technology effectively, and
to allow its absorption by local licensee enterprises in a reasonable time.
Foreign direct investment is presently encouraged to those that primarily use
advanced technologies such as electronics, machinery and metallurgy.
Government industrial policy towards technology adoption through licensing
agreements and joint ventures varied with the different stages of development.
In the 1960s, the dominant industries were textile, chemical, and other basic
industries; machinery and other manufacturing sectors were given priority
during the 1970s; in the 1980s, electronics and electrical equipment have
shown an increasing share of technology importation as the economy
transforms into a more developed stage.'
At the same time, the share of technology imports between 1983 and 1987
represents about 51 % in number and 70 % of the amount paid for total
technology importation from 1962 to 1987.' This figure reflects increasing
technology importation in recent years, and the content of technology has
changed from low-level to high-level technology, while the number of
6 Korea Economic Research institute, Technological Innovation Process of Korean
Industries and Governmental Policies, April, 1986.
' Ministry of Science and Technology, Science and Technology Annual, Seoul,
Korea, March, 1989.
technology imports has also been increasing. Thus, the pattern of technology
adoption in Korea shows the transition from labor-intensive, then capital-
intensive, and finally to technology-intensive production.
An important aspect of technology adaptation in Korea is how it has
utilized foreign technology: Korea has hired technology but has not hired
production. It welcomed foreign techniques but has not encouraged foreign
ownership. In this way, Korean firms have been able to strengthen their
bargaining position with multinationals and have forced them to sell
technology at lower prices.
In the process of approving investment proposals, the Economic Planning
Board generally discouraged the formation of wholly foreign-owned
subsidiaries, instead favoring joint ventures with shares not exceeding 50 % of
equity owned by foreigners. The Korean authorities have often prescribed
well-defined performance criteria for foreign investors in joint ventures with
local companies. The criteria cover the obligations of foreign partners, with
special emphasis on their technological contribution."
Korean engineers should be trained in the use of the foreign partner's
latest technology, including process design, detailed engineering, operation, and
maintenance. Korean engineers are encouraged to participate in all aspects of
production and to replace foreign employees as soon as possible.
8 Jinjoo Lee, Effects of Legislation and Regulations on Transfer of Technology: An
Empirical Analysis of the Experience of the Republic of Korea, Korea Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology, April, 1986.
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By acquisition of technology on the one hand and the production of goods
on the other hand, Korean firms have been able to absorb know-how and
modify imported technologies for their own specific use. This kind of practice
facilitated Korean firms in developing indigenous technology.
In the process of technology transfer from more advanced nations to a less
developed nation like Korea, the roles of multinational companies have had a
great impact on the development of technological capability. But the
development largely depends on a country's production capability, such as
skilled labor and sufficient production facilities. In the 1970s, many
multinational companies(MNCs) began to reallocate their production facilities
as global competition intensified.
In order to achieve comparative advantages in production, MNCs from
advanced countries moved their manufacturing facilities to less developed
countries. During this transition, Korea has been one of most desirable
places to manufacture goods, with its skilled labor, relatively low wages, and
large firms with modern manufacturing facilities.
In fact, multinational companies generally shifted production of those goods
that had reached the maturity of their product life-cycle. The technologies
had already been standardized for sometime. For these kind of products,
competition shifts to price/efficiency and away from design, with the
emergence of a dominant design - "standardization." In this stage of the
product cycle, scale and learning become important and specialized capital
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becomes deployed as firms seek to lower unit costs through exploiting
economies of scale and learning.
In this context, Korea is an attractive place for production. Large firms
dominate the economy, and highly- educated engineers and skilled labor are
available. In this sense, Korea offers unique complementary sources in
providing trained labor, manufacturing facilities, and access to the Korean
market. Large firms are more likely to possess the relevant specialized and
cospecialized assets, while the foreign MNCs secure benefits by saving the
expense of building complementary assets. In the meantime, large firms in
Korea make possible the intensive exploitation of production capacity with
better-equipped facilities and with well-trained labor.
In the productive process, learning takes place for local firms at the
manufacturing stage, consisting of developing increasing skills in production,
such as reducing real labor costs per unit of output. This improvement
culminates in the prior training and experience of Korean workers and firms.
Subsequently Korean firms have been able to achieve minor improvements
that enhance the rate of productivity growth. Although these kinds of
modification and improvements in production are not comparable to
"Schumpeterian innovation," Korea has certainly been active in "incremental
innovation" through "learning by doing."'
' Arrow, "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Rosenberg, ed., Inside
the Black Box: Technology and Economics, U.K. 1982.
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Through collaboration in joint ventures, Korean firms and MNCs have
been able to capture mutual benefits. The local firms have acquired
technological knowledge and know-how at the manufacturing stage, while
MNCs have maximized their profits by lowering production costs. This kind
of productive engagement represents a unique case of technology transfer from
advanced nations to less advanced nations. In future research, I hope to
compare Korea's success with that of other developing countries. What has
made Korea relatively attractive to MNCs, and how has Korea extracted
most benefit from the MNCs?
However, limitations arise where comparative advantages are not readily
available and when there is asymmetric information between two parties.
As technology becomes more sophisticated and complex and the life-cycle of
the technology shorter, it becomes more difficult to acquire effectively and
absorb know-how in a limited time. Nonetheless, joint ventures and licensing
agreements are major channels of technology transfer from more advanced
nations to less advanced nations.
2.4: SUMMARY
Throughout this chapter, I have investigated technological adaptation
through joint ventures and licensing agreements in the process of economic
development in Korea. I also have argued that the types of technologies
adopted by Korean firms have been largely influenced by different stages of
Korea's economic development and demands of an export-oriented economy.
At each stage of industrialization, the Korean economy has targeted certain
key industries to promote its economic development through exports, since its
domestic market was initially insufficient to foster demand-driven growth. In
the process of development on particular industries, it has deliberately selected
appropriate technologies on the basis of priority industries through joint
ventures and licensing agreements.
The observation of technological adaptation in Korea shows that it has
changed its acquisition from low-technology to advanced technology. The
frequency of technology importation has increased, as the economy transforms
from the early stage to the mature stage of industrialization. This
phenomenon may reflect the fact that technology has become a key factor in
production for Korea, to gain competitiveness in the global market.
I have also analyzed the collaboration between Korean local firms and
multinational companies as a mean of technology transfer from more
advanced nations to less advanced nations. In doing so, I have pointed out
that comparative advantages and manufacturing capability are considered
important factors for MNCS and acquisition and absorption of technology are
of great importance for local firms.
By engaging in collaboration in the form of joint ventures and licensing
agreements, MNCs are able to maximize their profits by lowering production
costs, generating royalty fees, and gaining access to the local market, while
local firms acquire necessary technologies with relatively low cost and within a
short time. Thus, the engagements provide benefits to both parties.
Another important aspect of this practice is that the technologies transferred
are mainly standardized ones for products at the maturity of their life-cycle in
the early stage of Korean economic development. Nonetheless, this type of
technology makes transfer easier and more effectively employed in mass
production.
However, joint ventures and licensing agreements have limitations because
of increasing asymmetric information and direct costs of transfer, as the
technology becomes more sophisticated and complex. For example, in the
electronics industry, the foreign technology acquired has often been outdated
and covers only a part of the required know-how for local manufacture of
high-value components and parts. As the economy matures and concentrates
in technology-intensive industries, more advanced technologies are required.
Joint ventures and licensing agreements are less effective tools in acquiring
technology when the economy is in the later stages of industrialization. A
country like Korea considers other modes of R&D to foster its economic
growth. Efforts already have taken place to promote indigenous technological
development and to improve the diffusion and assimilation of research findings
by private industry, in facing the rapidly changing nature of advanced
technology, increasing protection of intellectual property rights from more
advanced countries, and increasing price competition based on standardized
technology from other developing countries in the global market.
CHAPTER 3: TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE
3.1: INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the efforts of Korean industry to attain
technological independence, facing increasing global competition, due to the
relaxation of import restriction in domestic markets and intensified
protectionism from Western countries.
In challenging these emerging problems, Korea has pursued production
and innovation of new technologies and products, by accumulated
technological capability through adaptation of imported technology and
continuous investment in R&D. In examining this development, we will
investigate the automobile industry which has the representative characteristics
of being technology-intensive and being dominated by a few oligopolistic
companies.
The automobile industry underlines the stage of economic and technological
development in a particular country since it requires a certain level of
technological capability in production and has significant backward linkages
with other capital and technology intensive industries, such as the electrical,
electronics, machinery, and chemicals industries. In this context, technological
development in the automobile industry may reflect Korea's ability to produce
other technology intensive products.
In the process of examining the issue of technological independence, we
will follow the development of Hyundai Motor Company. The company is
distinctive in its independent approach to technological enhancement from
other Korean auto makers, that rely heavily on foreign technology in their
production.
In examining technological independence, we also examine a Japanese case-
study of the so-called "small-lot" system practiced by Toyota.' Toyota's
experience might differ in the aspect of initial size and pace of development,
but its efforts for technological independence share similar characteristics with
the recent strategy of Hyundai Motor Company for technological
independence. At the same time, they have performed better than other
domestic auto makers in their countries. Therefore, it seems that
technological independence provides other important elements to the firms in
improving production and non-production performance.
Michael A. Cusumano, M.I.T Working Paper #1817-86, Small-Lot Production:
Key to High Productivity and Quality in Japanese Auto Manufacturing, the Sloan
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
02139, August, 1986.
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3.2: BACKGROUND/DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY
The Korean automobile industry has largely depended on foreign
technologies including those of the Japanese. The importance of the
automobile industry arises from the fact that the automobile industry requires
inputs from other high technology-intensive industries, such as the chemical,
electrical, electronic, and machinery fields, and its high levels of linkages with
other high value-added products that aid in the generation of a high level of
income per unit of output. Korea is in the process of switching its economy
from low-technology intensive to high-technology intensive products, and
automobiles are part of this strategy. Automobiles also became one of the 10
major Korean exports for the first time in 1985.2
The Korean automobile industry is dominated by five producers, Hyundai,
Kia, Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Asia. The Korean auto industry was initiated
as a "sunrise" industry through the government's support in 1962, with import
restrictions and a tax reduction on imported parts promoting import
substitution. In the late 1960s the industry was mainly assisted by Japanese
auto manufactures. For instance, Kia contracted with Honda to produce
three wheeled vehicles, while Shinjin joined with Toyota in the production of
four wheel passenger cars. In 1967, Hyundai was assisted by Ford.
2 A World Bank Country Study, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition,
Volume II, March, 1987.
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In 1984, Pony's Canadian success helped the expansion of its market to
the U.S. through well targeted advertizing, and selective, highly reputable
dealers. This successful expansion of Korean car exports appeared to
crystalize the internationalization of the Korean auto industry. The major
advantage of the Pony was its low price compared to Japanese and US cars,
and this was supported by government subsidized loans to Hyundai with low
interest rates of 6.7 percent when the U.S. prime rate was about 14 percent.'
High productivity and low costs share some similarities with the Japanese
automobile industry in the 1970s, that depended on economies of scale
supported by large investment in plant and equipment.
In 1986 when the Hyundai' Excel was launched in North America with
sales of 168,000, it was considered a huge success. Since then, however, the
progress has been reversed, production falling by 13 % and exports of cars
declining by 18 % in 1990, although this decline has been offset by a
booming domestic market. However, this can not be a long term remedy for
declining exports, because the domestic market is not large enough to sustain
the auto industry indefinitely.
Moreover, a serious problem that Korean manufacturers face today is that
they are overdependent on the United States market, while they are also
constrained by lack of technology and a weakness in the domestic components
industry. Korean manufacturers try to overcome their lack of technology by
' Chosonilbo, November 6, 1982.
importing products and technology. For example, Hyundai purchased
technology from Mitsubishi through a 15% share in a joint venture. Daewoo
Motors is 50% owned by General Motors, while Kia Motors has technological
assistance from Mazda, with marketing by Ford.'
Such linkages, however, cause additional problems, in creating dependency
and the slow development of technologies necessary for design and components
manufacture. At the same time, acquiring foreign technology is becoming
more difficult. Volvo recently pulled out of its agreement with Ssangyong,
and Samsung is having a hard time finding a foreign partner.
There are many examples of unsuccessful joint ventures. Mitsubishi was
severely limited by its partnership with Chrysler. Chrysler decided to impose
its marketing strategy on Mitsubishi USA, and this retarded Mitsubishi's
flexibility. A technologically superior partner may impose constraints on the
junior company's growth.
3.3: HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY
In 1967, Hyundai Motor Company was the first to establish an automobile
assembly plant that could produce the whole vehicle within Korea. The
company produced Korea's first indigenous passenger car the "Pony" ( the
* Ministry of Science and Technology, '88 Science and Technology Annual, 1989.
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early edition of the current Excel). The production of "Pony" marked a
transition from import substitution to exporting, and was followed by
subsequent progress in production. In 1968, the company produced only 641
vehicles, but this had increased to 90,384 vehicles in 1982 this was about 57
percent of the total production of vehicles by all automobile companies in
Korea.'
Since then Hyundai has become the dominant leader with a 49.3 percent
market share in 1983 (the share in passenger cars was 76 percent), followed
by Daewoo with 16 percent. In terms of production capacity, Hyundai was
the largest producer with 41 percent of total capacity.' In 1985, Hyundai's
Excel accounted for more than 90 percent of total passenger car exports.
Behind this success, Hyundai's effort to gain technological independence
has played a major role. For example, Hyundai's strategy is quite different
from other auto makers in Korea. Hyundai recognized that self-reliance is
essential to become competitive in the world market. This rationale came
from its experience with Ford in the early 1970s. Hyundai attempted to
establish the joint venture with Ford as a channel of technology acquisition,
but lack of commitment by Ford and conflicts over production between the
two firms eventually resulted in a break-up.
At that time, the local market was very thin, therefore there was no
s Hyundai Jadongcha, Korea, 1982.
* Annual of Korean Transportation, Transportation News, Korea, 1984.
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incentive for Ford to commit technology transfer to Hyundai when Ford
targeted on the domestic market, except so far as necessary to take advantage
of lower labor costs through specializing the production process. Ford
demanded that participate take place in only limited areas:
- only diesel engines would be produced
- investment only in the areas that have potential for profits
- concentration more on the domestic market than for exports."
Ford was motivated by its global strategy for component specialization in
each country in New Zealand, Philippines, and Taiwan. It was clear to
Hyundai that the joint venture prohibited creativeness and independence that
were considered critical to growth. It was the beginning of the path to
Hyundai's technological independence.
Efforts for developing indigenous automobile production began in the early
1970s. Hyundai has concentrated on independent development by assembling
its own-designed engines several years ago, by forming its own research center
in 1970, and is now self-sufficient in most areas of design and manufacturing.
For example, Hyundai produced the Pony I with 85 % local content in 1975,
followed by the model Pony II, Stellar, and Excel. At the same time,
Hyundai has also increased its participation in design, skin layout, the master
drawing as well as in detail drawings from 35 % in Pony I to 80 % in
H llyundai Motor Company, The Twenty-Years History of Hyundai Motor
Company, Korea, 1987.
Excels.' In 1989, Hyundai's success in developing the new model, "Sonata",
reflects this self sufficiency.
Table 3.1: Participation by Korean Engineers
in Hyundai's Production
Model Pony I Pony II Stellar Excel
Period '74-'75 '80-'81 '81-'83 '82-'84
Skin Layout 20 ? 45 X 50. 60 .
Master Drawing 20 X 45 % 50 % 60 %
Detail Drawing 35 % 70 X 75 % 80 %
Source: Korea Economic Research Institute
In the meantime, Hyundai has also progressed in reducing production costs
by implementing a Suggestion System, Quality Control Circles, a Supplier
Quality Assurance System, and introducing Supplier Cooperative Association.
At the same time, the inventory ratio, that divides sales over inventory assets,
has improved from 5.3 in 1970 to 13.3 in 1987.
8 Korea Economic Research Institute, "The Automobile Industry," Technological
Innovation Process of Korean Industries and Governmental Policies, Korea, April,
1986.
Table 3.2: Inventory Turn Over of Hyundai Motor
Year '70 '73 '75 '78 '80 '82 '84 '86 '87
------------------------------------------------------
ITO 5.3 6.0 4.9 5.6 3.5 7.1 13.9 13.4 13.3
------------------------------------------------------
Source: Young-suk Hyun, "The History of Korean
Automobile Industry," July 1989.
3.4: THE TOYOTA CASE
These kinds of efforts for technological independence share similarities with
the early development of Toyota's "small-lot" production system that has
flexibility in adopting new technology and skills, through allowing workers to
perform several different machines simultaneously and to do their own
maintenance in a small work setting. As a result, workers paid more
attention to the whole process of production rather than on individual piece
making.
This idea came from Toyota's inability to purchase foreign technology.
According to Michael A. Cusumano, Toyota targeted the cultivation of in-
house design skills by setting up an inexpensive production system for low
volumes. Later, it bought universal machine tools and small stamping presses
that were affordable and easily adaptable for model changes. This was the
beginning of Toyota's "flexibility," and Toyota chose not to become affiliated
with European or U.S. auto producers, unlike other Japanese auto makers.
At the same time, Toyota adopted the concept of "just-in-time."' Since
the company did not have in-house production of components, in order to
increase equipment utilization and reduce inventories of work in-process, the
company had to synchronize subassembly production, parts deliveries, and
assembly.
By subcontracting component supplies, Toyota was able to decrease levels
of in-house vertical integration between component production and final
assembly, while building up networks of lower-wage subsidiaries and loosely
affiliated subcontractors.
This kind of production system also stimulated technological transfer from
Toyota to its subcontractors, resulting in improvement of the quality of
components. The value -added productivity of Toyota subsidiaries tripled
from 1960 to 1983, while that of Toyota increased by 2.8 times in the same
period."
Therefore, the "small-lot" system practiced by Toyota seems to increase
worker's output and utilization of machinery, while subcontracting with
component suppliers encouraged them to improve the quality of products
9 "Just-in-time" refers to a production practice where components are supplied by
subsidiaries and other subcontractors at the time when they are needed, instead of
being produced in-house. In that way, the company can save on the costs of
inventories and efficiently utilize main production facilities.
* Michael A. Cusumano, M. I. T. Working Paper #1817-86.
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through technological transfer and competition among themselves.
The lesson the automobile industry in developing countries can learn from
Hyundai and Toyota's experience is how these companies have developed their
technological capability through independent efforts.
3.5: SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented the case of the Korean automobile industry
in examining the issue of technology independence. It was seen that the
automobile industry requires inputs from other capital and technology-intensive
industries: great backward linkage. In that sense, technological capability in
the production of the automobile reflects the relative stage of industrialization.
First we presented the emerging needs of technological independence.
Second, the case of Hyundai Motor Company was presented in conjunction
with Toyota's case in Japan, in Hyundai's efforts to develop indigenous
technology from its early experience of joint venture with Ford. Both
companies have performed better than other auto makers in their respect
countries.
Although a technologically independent approach does not guarantee
successful technological progress and improvements in production, it has a
positive influence on flexibility in production and marketing. As a company
progresses to a more mature level, it seems that it requires a certain degree
of indigenous technological capability to compete in global markets.
Although the technological independent approach does not guarantee the
successful technological progress and improvement in production, it indicates
some positive aspects in flexibility on production and marketing. As a
company progresses to upper level, it seems that it requires a certain degree
of indigenous technological capability to compete in global markets.
CHAPTER 4: COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL
FIRMS
4.1: INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Four, we will explore the complementarity between large and
small firms and how small firms can contribute in enhancing the
competitiveness of Korean products in world markets as well as in minimizing
technological dependence on foreign countries.
As we already mentioned in previous chapters, Korea has an outward-
looking economy with high concentration by large firms: the so called big four
-- Daewoo, Hyundai, Lucky-Goldstar, and Samsung. The dominance of these
large firms has recently been viewed as ineffective for facing new challenges,
such as innovation of new products and sophisticated technologies. We will
argue that cultivating competitive home-based component suppliers is essential
if Korea's economy is to advance into high technology intensive production.
Then, we consider how technological improvement will enhance exports in
the future, while maintaining the steady economic growth and the need to
service Korea's debt obligations. We examine carefully the trade deficit with
Japan, because Korea has incurred the largest bilateral trade deficit with
Japan, due to imports of industrial components.
The narrowing of this deficit will mirror Korean industry's technological
independence by substituting domestic supply for imported components. Thus,
the bilateral trade deficit represents the heavy technological dependency of the
Korean economy on Japanese manufactures.
Technological dependence is one of the major characteristics shared by less
developed countries. According to the convergence theory (Kerr, Dunlop,
Harbinson and Myers), most industrializing countries will become increasingly
alike in the structure of their economies, regardless of their different cultures
or political organizations.
Therefore, this research has significance in the implications that it provides
other developing countries that follow a similar pattern to the Korean
development strategy. Countries that have transformed from early stages to
more mature stages of industrialization, will face similar kinds of technological
challenges in the near future.
4.2: PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE
Korea's dramatic speed of industrialization, technological progress, and
increasing participation in world markets have caught developed countries by
surprise, while its impressive rate of economic growth is envied by other
developing countries.
The recent trade deficit, however, that has followed a couple of years of
trade surpluses, has raised concern among Koreans. This is both because
Korean economic growth has been largely dependent on exports, and also
because Korea still has a huge foreign debt obligation: it is the world's fourth
largest debtor. The ratio of debt to gross domestic product(GDP) is 47.7%
in 1986.
Korea's external debt is closely related to its cumulative current account
deficit and its accumulation of foreign reserves. As the government begins to
allow capital outflows and relax import restrictions, expenditures on foreign
investment, spending on imports, and on tourism abroad by Koreans have all
jumped in recent years. Even though the relaxation of imports is partly an
attempt to promote more efficient domestic production through the
introduction of foreign competition, this measure has had some undesirable
effects on the economy. For instance, capital flight has increased more than
four fold from 1989 to 1990.
These two aspects of the Korean economy: its technological dependence
and its trade deficit, have important implications for the recent sluggish
economic growth. In response to international pressure to lift import
restrictions and the Korean people's desire to experience foreign goods, the
expansion of markets for Korean exports is crucial for maintaining economic
growth.
The high degree of dependency on foreign technology and the technological
gap between industries have resulted as a by-product of the rapid
1 Han-kyoreh Shinmun(Daily Newspaper), April 9, 1990.
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industrialization and adoption of the Japanese development model and its
technology.2  As we see in the Exhibit 2, Korea imports more than 50% of
its imports of technology from Japan.
This strategy follows the recommendation of Adam Smith; emphasis is
given to promoting economies of scale for efficient utilization of resources, and
then competing on the basis of price in the world market. During the past
25 years of Korea's industrialization, export growth has stimulated the inflow
of technology and acquisition of know-how and has had a great effect on the
structure of Korean industry.
For example, during Korea's heavy industrialization drive, the steel
industry was launched with major equity participation by the government,
using the Japanese steel industry as its model, and with participation of
Japanese firms in plant development as well as in worker training. At the
same time, the number and scale of the major conglomerates expanded and
focused on technology, diversification , and establishing their brand names.
Woojung Kim, the chairman of Daewoo, mentioned at a recent MIT
seminar that Korean firms had to diversify to minimize their business risk
from fluctuations of the world economy. Their business growth had largely
depended on exports based on borrowed technology. He indicated that the
large firms that dominate Korean industry have followed the directive of the
government to attain targeted rates of economic growth.
2 Please refer to Exhibit 2.
In 1978, value-added production of the 50 largest firms equalled 43 % of
GDP, while this same proportion of GDP was shared by only 30 large firms
in 1983. These firms also had access to 48 % of total bank credit -- the
top five held 24.2 %. The expansion of large firms and the development of
industry, with the majority of technological imports coming from Japan, have
created a pattern of dependency and imbalanced trade for Korea vis-a-vis
Japan.
Although geographical and cultural similarities between Japan and Korea
allowed Japan to provide greater technical assistance for Korean
industrialization, this kind of adoption and learning created a heavy
dependency on certain intermediate goods, such as, steel ingots, some
chemicals, electronics and machinery."
With a poor natural resource endowment and a relatively small domestic
market, Korea still has to depend largely on exports for its growth. The
share of export of goods and services in GNP rose from 8.5% in 1965 to as
high as 41% in 1986. However, the recent Korean growth slow-down to less
than 7% in 1989, is the smallest increase since 1981.
According to the Bank of Korea, the slowdown reflected a sharp decline
in exports, resulting from appreciation of the won and the impact of labor
unrest negatively affecting productivity. This underlines how Korea's future
3 Please refer to Exhibit 2.
* Korea Industrial Research Institute(KIRI), Industrial Technology White Paper,
October 31, 1988.
economic growth will depend largely on how well its exports perform.
Korea, however, faces strong protectionism from the United States which is
the largest importing country for Korean goods(40% of Korean exports in
1986). In addition, the potential threat from China and other NICs(newly
industrialized countries) in labor intensive export markets, forces Korea to
move toward more capital and technology intensive industries.
Korea seems to have an advantage against Japan in labor-intensive
consumer goods such as clothing, travel goods, various textiles, and some
standardized intermediate goods, while it has disadvantages in technologically
advanced capital goods. It appears to be increasingly difficult for Korea to
pursue its areas of comparative advantage against Japan. Korea is perceived
as a competitor to Japan as well as to the other developed countries. Japan
now hesitates to locate its production process in Korea, being afraid of
technology outflows, called a "boomerang effect", while Japan now imposes
restrictions on Korean textile exports.
In response to this measure, Korea has launched a five-year program to
reduce the bilateral trade deficit with Japan, with localization of previously
imported components and switching imports from Japan to the United States.
The inability to resist pressure to import exerted by the United States and
European countries, along with people's desire to taste foreign goods and
services domestically, and the threat from other developing countries in its
current export markets, implies that competitiveness through technological
progress is a crucial component of Korea's future economic growth.
4.3: THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF SMALL FIRMS
In the context of technological independence, efficient technological transfer
to small and medium-size firms should be considered an important factor.
These firms also should be considered as complementary sources acting as
component suppliers for big firms in production rather than a competing
agent for the allocation of capital investment.
As we previously mentioned, the biased support of large firms during past
Korean industrialization, with its emphasis on the efficient utilization of
resources, have left small firms largely neglected.
Since 1980, the small firms's contribution to the Korean economy has
improved.' Small firms are 97.6% by number of firms, 57.4% in
employment, 39.1% in value-added, and 37.% in GNP.' Although, as the
data indicate, small firms' contribution to the number of firms and
employment in the Korean economy is reasonably large, the share of value-
added and GNP have been relatively small. One of the major reasons is the
lack of organizational capability in production, in terms of technical
6 Small firm is defmed as a firm with fewer than 300 employees.
6 1988 Industrial Technology White Paper, KIRI, Korea, October 31, 1988.
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knowledge, size, and financial resources as they try to change their production
from light manufacturing to intermediate products.
According to a European case study done by Hans Corsten and Otmar
Lang, small and medium sized firms have inherited structural disadvantages
stemming from size, including:
- Lacking financial resources
- Lacking information with regards to: potential
technology suppliers, solutions towards technical
problems, market structure.
- Staff restrictions: lack of qualified personnel,
lack of staff, non-acceptance of technical change.
These kinds of problems are also shared by Korean small firms. How
these factors have affected these firms in adopting new and sophisticated
technology and knowledge should be examined in the particular Korean case.
In the summer of 1989, when I visited the Association for small and
medium size firms in Korea, it was mentioned that employers of these firms
generally lack information to advance their production capacity and face a
shortage of qualified employees in several important managerial sectors. For
example, tax breaks given to these firms were mostly left unused, because the
costs of hiring an accountant to file for the tax break exceeded the size of
the benefit itself. Thus, access to outside information and assistance are
very limited for small and medium-size firms.
4.4: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DIFFUSION
Although small firms face many difficulties in their operation, an European
study done by the IFO Institute shows their positive impact on technological
progress. A high proportion of European patents(52%) are taken out by this
sector. The major sectors of patents applied for in the last five years by
small firms until 1986 were in steel construction and mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering, and information technology.
The study also found relatively little technology transfer. The sale of
know-how is the main method of technology transfer, as well as through the
issue of licenses. University-linked technology transfer agencies are also of
importance. The bodies most frequently consulted are chambers of industry
and commerce, and trade associations, because collaboration with them has
proved efficient in the past.
The enterprises regard the following as significant obstacles:
- Lack of information about potential partners
- Lack of confidence in partners
- Lack of staff time
This indicates that technology transfer as part of an innovation policy
depends less on direct financial support than on the availability of an
information structure. Therefore, the lack of financial resource seems to be
less problematic than the lack of information flow to small firms. At the
same time, this study shows that small firms certainly have advantages in the
act of technological innovation itself. In addition, two major requirements
are essential in improving the efficiency of the process of technology transfer:
personal support within the framework of the development of technology
transfer, and the availability of an infrastructure that on the one hand takes
technical aspects into consideration, and that disposes information about
relevant technology suppliers on the other.
Higher transparency of the technology market and the set up of a
information infrastructure appear to be the major ingredients for successful
technology transfer.
On the other hand, a study of technological diffusion in U.S.
biotechnology by Alice M. Sapienza suggests that market forces and
established pharmaceutical companies(bureaucratic stolidity) - put pressure on
managers for short-term payoffs. Managers tend to adopt marketing
efficiency and managerial risk aversion strategies rather than depending on the
quality of human resources and investment in R&D.
Sharps also mentions the absence of creativity among large pharmaceutical
companies:
"The flexibility of the small CBSs(commercial biotechnology
companies) not only fostered the application of new techniques, but
also the conception, design and development of products addressed
to markets that were previously nonexistent. It is very likely the
environment of a large pharmaceutical company might diminish this
creative spirit."
Thus this study shows that the pharmaceutical companies, after rapid
expansion and globalization, have transformed into more efficient marketing
organizations than discovery organizations. For instance, R&D expenditure is
generally one-quarter of marketing and sales expenses.' Therefore, large
firms do not necessary contribute their resources for R&D development in the
industry, although they have advantages over small firms, in terms of their
capacity for seeking finance and easier access to valuable information.
4.5: SUBSIDY
Indicators of technological performance would include the numbers of
patents granted, the level of productivity, the shares of new products in sales
and the export-import ratio in high-technology products. A study by Henning
Klodt in 1987 suggests that Japan's exports of high-tech products are more
than four times as high as its imports of high-technology intensive products.
At the same time, the most successful exporter of high-technology products
has the lowest level of government subsidies. For example, the share of
public funds for instrument and motor vehicles, that are the major exports of
Japan, is less than 1 %, whereas their share in private funds amounts to 18
7 Industry Analysis Division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, "A Competitive
Assessment of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry," Washington, DC, 1984.
H enning Klodt, "R&D Subsides and Export Performance of Manufacturing
Industries," Thechnovation, 7, 1987.
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It seems that there is an inverse relationship between direct government
R&D support and export-import ratios in high-technology products( aerospace,
electrical equipment, machinery, chemicals, instruments,and motor vehicles).
He found that one reason for this poor performance is the concentration of
governments' R&D subsidies on a few industries.
In the case of developing countries, the major aims of the government to
spend, in most cases, is to catch up with other developed countries'
technologies. Korea is in the position of defending its world market share
by switching its exports from low technology intensive products to high
technology intensive products. In the early period of Korean industrialization,
subsidies on heavy industry failed somewhat to achieve their initial goal.
During the late 1970s, the shipbuilding industry experienced overcapacity.
Although government subsidies are an important resource for R&D and
technological progress, inefficient use of funds in certain industries should be
avoided.
4.6: THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL FIRMS IN KOREA
Small firms in Korea tend to rely heavily on technological acquisition
through informal channels such as technical assistance from local R&D
institutions, buyers & suppliers of equipment or materials, and technical
journals to raise technological capability, and personnel experience.
This kind of technology transfer has some advantages in terms of low cost,
new product development without technological dependence, and the possibility
of developing locally-appropriate technology, but there are shortcomings such
as a technology gap.' A recent study done for 66 firms out of a sample of
90 innovative small firms also shows that these firms achieved technological
progress without formal collaboration."
The recently established small firms, however, appear to have better
prepared for dealing with this technological gap. For new small technology-
based firms, the employment generation tends to be higher than existing firms.
These new firms also have invested more in R&D than have the existing
ones. The R&D expenditure for the new firms is 24.5 % of sales and 5.1
% for the existing firms. At the same time, the contents of sales of
innovative products is 77.1 % for the new small firms and 19.3 % for the
existing small firms."
In the meantime, the majority of these enterprises are established by
younger entrepreneurs than existing ones and 65 % of these new
entrepreneurs formerly held top management positions in large firms. They
* Zong-tae Bae and Jinjoo Lee, "Technology Development Patterns of Small and
Medium Sized Companies in the Korean Machinery Industry", Technovation 4,
1986.
* Linsu Kim and Youngbae kim, "Innovation in a Newly Industrializing Country: a
Multiple Discriminant Analysis," Management Science, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1985.
" Korea Economic Research Institute.
had gained manufacturing know-how through their experience prior to
operating their own firms. At the same time, 90 % of these entrepreneurs
hold a college degree and 15 % of them hold graduate degrees. It is logical
that they are mostly engaged in high-technology intensive industries such as
microelectronics and computers."
It seems that Korea has begun to undertake an innovative approach to
production at the small firm level as society requires more complex technology
and sophisticated products. It is also viewed as a positive development as
the need for technological independence increases in the face of protectionism
of intellectual property rights from other industrialized countries.
In developing small firms' technological capability, the Korean experience
shows that creation of markets for these firms is the most important factor,
in addition to financial support. This fact reflects that a demand side
strategy is more effective than a supply side strategy, because top
management is more committed when there are market opportunities and not
just the simple availability of R&D subsides." Therefore, the development
strategy should be linked between these two stimuli: supply side strategy of
financial supports and a demand side strategy of creating market opportunity
12 Source: Korea Economic Research Institute.
" Linsu Kim et al, "Korea's Entry into the Computer Industry and Its Acquisition
of Technological Capability," Technovation, Vol. 6, 1987.
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4.7: ALLIANCES BETWEEN SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS
As an alternative strategy for technological progress, it is useful to look
at "strategic alliances" and the managing of complementary assets. Reflecting
Joseph Schumpeter's idea of the need for radical technological innovation in
the vulnerability of established firms to technological discontinuity that
inevitably results in their obsolescence, many large firms have tried to
pioneer new industries and numerous established firms have been at the
forefront in the effort to generate radically new technologies.
These accomplishment are relatively minimal compared to the size of their
investments, in the case of semiconductor technology, robotics, personal
computers, and new materials. This may explain the arguments of Abernathy
and Utterback that the price of product maturity and the quest for efficiency
is decreasing receptiveness to radical improvements.
Strategic alliances provide alternatives for collaboration between firms with
minimal contamination of the pioneering and entrepreneurial spirit of new
technology-based firms. For instance, it may be preferable to ride the
dynamics of the environment rather than fight them. Many firms have
managed these dynamics through strategic alliances between the large
established firm and small firms launched to exploit a new technology. The
large firm can supply its accumulated resources, while the small firm supplies
its intense efforts focussed on the new technology.
As Michael Porter argues, a disadvantage in a static model of competition
can become an advantage in a dynamic one. For example, when there is an
ample supply of cheap materials or abundant labor, companies can rest on
these advantages and often deploy them inefficiently yet survive; but
companies in a nation where these factors do not exist must innovate and
upgrade to compete. The absence of competitive supplier industries and
other related industries lead to difficulties in international competition."
In addition, internationally competitive home-based suppliers create
advantages for down stream industries in several ways. First, they deliver the
most cost-effective inputs in an efficient and rapid way. They provide an
advantage in innovation and upgrading based on close working relationships.
Suppliers and end-users located near each other make the quick and constant
flow of communication easier.
Therefore, the interaction between large firms and small firms through
subcontracting, supported by technical assistance, would reinforce the
industry's ability to compete in world markets. In particular, in technology
intensive industries like the automobile industry, large firms can benefit from
the complementarity of small firms by economizing capital expenditure in
producing components, and in easing the task of managing a huge vertically
integrated structure.
At the same time, small firms' flexibility makes it easier for them to
" Michael Porter E., "The Competitive Advantage of Nations," Harvard Business
Review, March-April, 1990, No. 2.
adopt changes, and competitive home-based suppliers would certainly provide
complementarity for large firms. Therefore, isolated support of large firms
through subsidies, cheap loans, and other mechanisms would not desirable.
For example, large firms merely depending on cheap labor, a favorable
exchange rate, and government supports will not sustain competitiveness in the
dynamic and complex world market. Static efficiency is less critical than the
need for dynamic improvements in the face of global competition.
Therefore, in Korea, the linkage between large and small firms is crucial
in promoting technological innovation and progress. Well equipped and
competitive small firms could be instrumental to large firms' growth and their
ability to compete in global markets by providing quality and lower priced
components to these large firms.
4.8: SUMMARY
Throughout Chapter Four, we have examined the complementarity between
small and large firms. First we have observed the emerging need for
developing indigenous technology by looking at the trade pattern with Japan.
Next, we investigated other means for developing technology; these examples
underline the fact that subsidies and direct financial support tend to have less
beneficial effect on technological development, as exemplified by the experience
of small firms in Korea.
Therefore, the linkage between small firms and large firms will enhance
effective technological transfer from large firms to small firms, while large
firms provide markets and technical assistance for small firms, and small
firms supply quality components essential to domestic producers at lower
prices. Market creation for small firms is also highlighted as the most crucial
factor in enhancing the technological capability of small firms. As mentioned
earlier, the commitment of top management is a key factor for technological
progress. Competition for market opportunities among these small firms will
play a great role in the improvement of production.
This kind of alliance is crucial to Korea, due to the business environment
it faces in the global market: increasing protectionism for its exports, the
potential threat from other developing countries in the existing export markets,
and increasing demands for quality products by domestic customers with the
relaxation of import restrictions.
In Korea, it seems that the firms already have taken substantial efforts in
R&D investment and in development of indigenous technology among different
levels of firms and sectors of industry. Future study will consider the
following issues: how Korea can serve its own economic development by
enhancing its technological capability, as well as serving other developing
countries in their economic development.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the thesis, I have discussed technological development from the
perspective of developing countries. These countries tend to develop their
technological capability through adaptation of foreign technology in the
beginning of their industrialization, through informal and formal channels of
technology acquisition.
First, the Korean case suggests that a less developed country progresses in
its technological capability through three stages of development:
acquisition/implementation, assimilation, and improvement. In each stage,
accumulation of knowledge and skills occur and this eventually enables the
creation of indigenous technology and product.
In order to achieve technological progress, there are some critical elements.
For example, the educational level of labor, the industrial infrastructure, the
receptiveness of management skills, entrepreneurship, and government industrial
policy appear to be important factors in contributing to technological progress.
At the same time, this pattern of technological progress is distinct from
the experience of developed countries. The major reasons are that developing
countries lack knowledge and skills in basic and applied science and
technology, including lack of financial resources. In that sense, I have tried
to examine how less developed countries are able to develop their
technological capability in enhancing economic growth through examining the
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Korean case. Therefore, the Korean case shows that analyzing technological
development from the perspective of developed countries can be misleading,
considering less developed countries, when they gradually improve their ability
to develop new technologies and products.
Second, in observing the process of technology transfer, I have considered
joint ventures, licensing agreements, and the role of multinational firms,
including government policy toward technology adaptation. It was shown that
the joint venture and licensing agreements have some limitations as the
economy matures, and at the firm level they put constraints on flexibility for
creativity and expansion of production.
Although these channels of technology transfer are efficient on grounds of
cost and speed, they tend to be less effective means of technology transfer in
the later stages of economic development. I hope to consider specific Korea
case studies in later research to document this claim.
Third, I have addressed the technological independence issue when facing
increasing international protectionism and intense global competition.
Hyundai's example is presented in evaluating the need for technological "self-
reliance." In Hyundai's early experience, technological dependency created
severe constraints on management and on production ability, and technology
transfer tends to be less efficient when the technologically superior partner is
not fully committed to the joint project. Since adopting an independent
strategy, Hyundai has been the most successful auto producer in Korea.
Finally, I have suggested alternative ways to enhance the competitiveness
of local firms in Korea. In doing that, I have attributed the bilateral trade
deficit with Japan to the import of industrial components. Therefore, the
narrowing of this deficit will reflect changes in technological independence, to
some degree.
I have provided an overview of the effects of R&D policy in other
countries, in addition to the case of Korean small firms. The results show
that the demand side of policy, enhancing market opportunities, is the major
incentive for small firms to innovate. At the same time, direct public
subsidies and financial support tend to be less effective.
This study has undertaken research based more on a theoretical framework
rather than on actual experience. In a way, it lacks some relevant evidence,
which would enhance my findings for technological progress in less developed
countries, but it provides a conceptual understanding for technological
development from the perspective of less developed countries. I hope, in later
research, to make clearer findings to assist technological development in less
developed countries, not for merely its own sake, but so that it may be used
to better people's lives.
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EXHIBIT 1
Foreign Technology Allowances by Field and Year
'67-'71'72-'76'77-'81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 Total
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5 22 42 20 20 26 23 21 44 223
285 434 1276 361 362 437 454 517 637 4763
Note: All units are number of cases
Source: 1988 Science and Technology Annual,
Ministry of Science and Technology,
Seoul, Korea, March 15, 1989.
EXHIBIT 2
Foreign Technology Allowances by Nation
-------------------------------------------
1962-81 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total Percentage
------ ----------------------------------------------------
U. S. 466 68 77 99 114 157 180 1161 25%
Japan 1125 164 201 217 228 264 307 2506 53%
Germany 93 14 20 36 29 23 35 250 5%
France 46 16 10 23 14 19 40 168 4%
U. K. 14 14 13 14 21 11 21 164 3%
Other 177 32 41 48 48 43 54 443 9%
------ ----------------------------------------------------
Total 1977 308 362 437 454 517 637 4692 100%
Note: All units are number of cases
Source: 1987 Report for Technology Imports,
Korea Industrial Research Institute,
Seoul, Korea, March 1988.
EXHIBIT 3 - a
GNP & INVESTMENT 1962-1986
(in billion won at 1975 market price)
---- --------------------------------------------------------
1962 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986
---- --------------------------------------------------------
GNP 3071 4378 6962 11276 147241 22600
Investment 295 824k 1955 3112 4892 6800
Investment/GNP 9.61% 18.82% 28.08% 27.60% 33.22% 30.09%
--------------------------------------------------------
Source: Bank of Korea
EXHIBIT 3 - b
INVESTMENT/GNP 1962-1986
(in billion won at 1975 market price)
1966 1971 1976 1981
years








EXHIBIT 4 - a
R&D INVESTMENT
(in billion won at 1975 market price)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Public Funds 2155 2385 2886 2767 3065 3601 4332 5776
Percentage 68 59 52 38 32 28 26 28
Private Funds 1014 1658 2664 4515 6512 9261 12331 14853
Percentage 32 41 48 62 68 72 74 72
Total 3169 4043 5550 7282 9577 12862 16663 20629
Note: Investment in social science excluded
Source: Science and Technology Annual
EXHIBIT 4 - b
R&D INVESTMENT
(in billion won at 1975 market price)



























1980 1981 1986 1987
EXHIBIT 5
Patents Granted by Nationality and Year
------ --------------------------------------------------------------
Nationality 1982 Percentage 1983 1984- 1985 1986 1987 Percentage
------ --------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2609 2448 2365 2268 1894 2330
Korean 271 11% 215 297 349 458 596 26%
Foreigner 2335 89% 2203 2068 1919 1436 173k 74%
------ --------------------------------------------------------------




1986 Percentage 1987 Percentage
Passenger car Production 157383 793125
Domestic Sales 156464 34*% 249319 31%



















Total Production 601546 980356
Domestic Sales 288251 48% 420421 43%
Exports 306369 51% 546310 56%
Note: The discrepency between production
and sales is inventory.






Foreign Technology Allowances by Large and Small Firms
'62-'66 '67-'71 '72-'76 '77-'81 '82-'86 1987 Total
Large Firms 26 178 293 796 1042 264 2599
(Percentage) 78.79% 62.46% 67.51% 64.98% 50.14% 41.38% 55.39%
Small Firms 7.00 107.00 141.00 425.00 1030.00 367.00 2077.00
(Percentage) 21.21% 37.54% 32.49% 34.69% 49.57% 57.52% 44.27%
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 16.00
(Percentage) 0.33% 0.29% 0.94% 0.34%
Total 33 285 434 1225 2078 638 4692
Note: All units are number of cases.
Source: 1987 Report for Foreign Technology Allowances,
Korea Industrial Research Institute, March 1988.
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